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In recent years, learned journals have proliferated world-wide and it might well be 
asked why a new on-line periodical devoted to Asian Legal History should be added to 
the large number of already existing specialized publications.  But East Asia has a long 
and distinguished history of legal development that has been too little studied in the past 
and is only now attracting deserved scholarly interest so that a new forum for the 
discussion of individual topics and for comparative research seems to be called for.  
Already in the fifth century B.C.   Chinese philosophers were debating the nature and 
purpose of law and we have documentation of this legal tradition over more than 2,000 
years.  Moreover, Chinese law was adopted in Korea and Vietnam and to a certain extent 
also in Japan, so that the Chinese legal sphere included more or less the whole of East 
Asia.  Also the sedentary peoples of Central Asia, above all the Uighurs, in the Middle 
Ages took over many elements of Chinese law. 
The unparalleled continuity of Chinese legal thought and institutions does, 
however, not mean that the basic features of law remained unchanged. The medieval 
dynasties of conquest such as the Khitan state of Liao (907-1125), the Jurchen Chin state 
(1115-1234) and the Mongol Yüan dynasty (1271-1368) have left a deep impact on 
Chinese law, so that the interaction of Chinese and alien legal elements has become a 
promising field of study. Another relatively recent development concerns the legal 
content.  It is well known that Chinese codifications over the centuries deal primarily 
with what we might call penal and administrative regulations.  The successive codes were 
formulated and issued by a bureaucratic state that regarded law as a restrictive and 
coercive tool for shaping human society according to preconceived and immutable ideals.  
Very little on private law, such as the law of contracts and property, could be deduced 
from the text of the codes.  
This situation has nowadays changed considerably.  Many documents on sales, 
mortgages and other transactions between individuals or groups have been found in the 
20th century in Central Asia, dating mostly from the first millennium A. D.   In addition, 
local archives and newly discovered or hitherto neglected printed collections of decisions 
in civil law suits include a rich documentation of private law in all its aspects.  We are 
therefore much better informed about Chinese private law than fifty or eighty years ago.  
This too is a development that will certainly be reflected in the content matter of the new 
journal. 
The only other legal sphere outside China that has an equally long history is that 
of Roman Law and its various modern adaptations.  In this context we should remember 
that even today Roman Law proper is still used in some parts of the world, for example in 
Scotland and, unlikely as it seems at first glance, South Africa.  The influence of Roman 
legal concepts pervades subliminally even our studies of Asian legal history.  Concepts 
like property, possession or purchase and sale derive ultimately from the corresponding 
Roman, that is, Latin words and their definition.  It is therefore a legitimate question to 
ask to what degree these concepts can be applied to the Chinese legal tradition and 
whether they are identical or should be modified when studying Asian legal history.  
What exactly corresponds in Chinese law to the concept of property (dominium)?  Such 
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questions may perhaps lead to a deeper understanding of Chinese legal thought and serve 
as a reminder that our accepted western notions are possibly not as universal as we would 
like to think. 
We can also notice a fundamental difference between law in China and in the 
sphere of Roman law.  In medieval Europe jurisprudence has emerged as a field of 
intellectual logical inquiry and ratiocination and been adopted into the university 
curricula.  The development of legal thought in Europe has therefore been largely non-
governmental and academic as a  result of the efforts of many generations of individual 
scholars and their  schools.  A similar phenomenon can be observed in Islamic and 
Jewish law, where exegesis and adaptation of the revealed canon was in the hands of 
individual thinkers and not institutionalized.  In traditional China up to the 19th century 
no jurisprudence in the western sense had evolved.  It is true that there existed legal 
specialists under the successive dynasties but they were all civil servants, mostly in the 
Ministry of Punishment (xing-bu 刑部), and not independent scholars.  Legal studies as 
an academic subject have therefore been a relatively recent innovation in early 20th 
century China. 
In the future the study of Asian legal history will perhaps not only deal with 
single historical topics but also try to explore hitherto unknown territory.  Tibet is now a 
part of China but our knowledge of law in Tibet and its history is deplorably scanty.  On 
a more general level attention might also be drawn to fundamental phenomena that we 
encounter in all known legal systems.  Three of these will be outlined briefly below. 
The first is the question of legal transfer or legal acculturation.  We find examples 
not only in modern times such as the introduction of Common Law in Hong Kong, but 
also in the past.  The adoption of Chinese law in Korea and Vietnam or Chinese legal 
influence on the peoples of Central Asia are further instances of legal transfer which 
deserve to be studied.  Another fundamental question concerns the origin of law.  What is 
the relation between religio and ius?  In most if not all civilizations a god or supernatural 
being was believed to have created cosmic order, followed by human attempts to preserve 
this order and to achieve secular control of human society.  In this respect it is sometimes 
difficult to distinguish clearly between legal regulation and morals which both seem to 
jointly condition human behavior even if they are not identical.  What is legally permitted 
or enforced may not always be moral--an eternal conflict that has pervaded human life 
since times immemorial.  As a third field one could mention the antagonism and 
occasional interaction between law on one hand and customs or usages on the other. 
When looking at social reality we might perhaps discover that the letter of codified law is 
sometimes a superstructure, an abstraction under which unwritten local or societal 
customs continued to be observed. 
In closing I wish to express the personal hope that the above sketchy remarks 
might underline the desirability of this new journal that will certainly develop into an 
international forum for a deeper study of Asian legal history. 
